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Summary: This article aims to identify the link between EU electoral 
rights and national citizenship and to situate these rights in the broad-
er context of EU citizenship. For these purposes, two recent judgments 
of the European Court of Justice regarding EU elections dated 12 Sep-
tember 2006 are discussed (Spain v United Kingdom and Eman & Se-
vinger). These judgments establish important principles for the election 
of the European Parliament, especially the scope ratione personae of 
recognised electoral rights of EU citizens and the boundaries framing 
national policies in this respect. They either leave Member States free 
to apply residence criteria in order to limit the scope ratione personae 
of EU electoral rights or to invoke their own constitutional traditions to 
extend that scope. This is not to say, however, that the Member States 
enjoy complete freedom in this respect. The paper concludes that the 
current fundaments of EU citizenship are weak in EU primary law, 
in particular in the fi eld of political rights. For this reason, the Euro-
pean elections and, more generally, the European democratic process 
should be discussed once again at the highest political level.
I. Introduction
The European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) rarely deals with 
electoral rights1 but has never addressed the matter of rights to vote and 
stand as a candidate in elections for appointment to the European Parlia-
ment. Recently, however, the ECJ’s Grand Chamber has had to deal with 
questions concerning the identity of persons who enjoy active and pas-
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Peter Van Elsuwege (Ghent University) and the scientifi c committee of this review for their 
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1  One of the sole examples was the procedure initiated by the Commission against Bel-
gium for not having brought into force within the prescribed period the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Council Directive (EC) 94/80 of 19 
December 1994 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member 
State of which they are not nationals. See ECJ Case C-323/97 Commission v Belgium [1998] 
ECR I-4281.
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sive voting rights in European elections, and has issued two important 
judgments.2 
The fi rst case (Spain v United Kingdom) was a consequence of the 
Matthews judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (herein-
after ECtHR).3 In this judgment, the ECtHR decided that the European 
Parliament (hereinafter EP) must be qualifi ed as a ‘legislative organ’ in 
Gibraltar. As a consequence, the United Kingdom was obliged to organise 
European elections there. However, according to its electoral traditions, 
the United Kingdom extended active and passive voting rights in Euro-
pean elections to certain persons that are not UK nationals. It recog-
nised these rights for non-UK nationals who are Commonwealth citizens, 
namely Qualifying Commonwealth Citizens (hereinafter QCCs) residing 
in Gibraltar. Generally, a Member State may grant higher standards of 
rights than those prescribed by international law, such as Article 3 of the 
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR). Questions arise, however, as 
to the limits to EU citizenship as set down by primary EC law: can (pri-
mary) Community law limit the freedom of the Member States to provide 
third-country nationals with the right to vote at European elections and 
perhaps, even, the right to be elected to the EP? 
In the second case (Eman & Sevinger) the Raad van State of the 
Netherlands (hereinafter Dutch supreme administrative court) asked the 
ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the freedom for a Member State to 
exclude some of its own citizens from those voting rights when they re-
side in overseas countries.4 It is important to emphasise that the Court 
2  See ECJ Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-7917 and Case C-300/04 
Eman & Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055. See fi rst comments in F Kauff-Gazin, ‘Droits de vote 
et d’éligibilité au Parlement européen’ (2006) Europe 8; A Dawes (2006) 3 RDUE 707-712; 
M Claes (2007) 5 SEW 216-221; L Burgogue-Larsen, ‘L’identité de l’Union européenne au 
cœur d’une controverse territoriale tricentenaire. Quand le statut de Gibraltar réapparaît 
sur la scène judiciaire européenne’ (2007) 1 RTDE 25-45; E Broussy, F Donnat and C Lam-
bert, ‘Actualité du droit communautaire’ (2006) AJDA 2271-2272.
3  See ECtHR Case Matthews v United Kingdom [1999] App n° 24833/94 para 54. See P 
Tavernier (2000) JDI 2000 97-102; A Bultrini, ‘La responsabilité des Etats membres de 
l’Union européenne pour les violations de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme 
imputables au système communautaire’ (2002) RTDH 20-23; RA Lawson, ‘Comment’ (1999) 
10 SEW 390-392. See in particular, on this evolution, C Desmecht, ‘Le droit aux élections 
libres dans la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’ (2002) CDPK 480-481; R 
Ergec, Protection européenne et internationale des droits de l’homme (Mys & Breesch CDPK 
Libri, Ghent 2000) 8; G Goedertier and Y Haeck, ‘Artikel 3 Eerste Protocol. Recht op vrije 
en geheime verkiezingen’ in J Vande Lanotte and Y Haeck (eds), Handboek EVRM (Inter-
sentia, Antwerpen 2004-2005) 466-467; S Van Drooghenbroeck, La Convention européenne 
des droits de l’homme: trois années de jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme (1999-2001) (Larcier - Les dossiers du Journal des Tribunaux, Bruxelles 2003) 
225-226.
4  In Aruba, in this case.
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followed the tendency of the ECtHR and without any diffi culty accepted 
residence as a limit to voting rights. EC law does not apply in Aruba and 
hence the EP cannot be considered as a legislative organ there. Thus, nei-
ther EC law nor the ECHR or its protocols are capable of granting directly 
to Eman and Sevinger - who are living in Aruba - the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in European elections. The problem here was that 
Dutch electoral law excluded its own nationals from these elections only 
when they resided in Aruba and the Dutch Antilles, and not elsewhere in 
the world. The ECJ was asked to give its ruling on this distinction.
The recent judgments of the ECJ establish important principles on 
the election of the EP, especially the scope of recognised electoral rights of 
EU citizens and the boundaries framing national policies in this respect. 
They either leave Member States free to apply residence criteria in order 
to limit the scope ratione personae of EU electoral rights or leave Member 
States free to invoke their own constitutional traditions to extend that 
scope. However, as will be discussed further, this is not to say that the 
Member States enjoy complete freedom in the determination of the scope 
ratione personae of EU electoral rights.
The solutions provided by the ECJ can be criticised on a number 
of grounds. The fi rst section of the paper analyses active and passive 
electoral rights in European Parliament elections (see II below) and the 
subsequent section aims to identify the practical consequences of the 
above-mentioned case law of the ECJ (see III below). However, those judg-
ments would lose much of their interest if they were not placed in the 
broader context of European citizenship. A dichotomy arises here: on 
the one hand, we have the proactive intervention of the ECJ in the fi eld 
of the right of Union citizens and their family members to move and re-
side freely within the territory of the Member States; on the other hand, 
there are important - and even constitutional - limits to rights of politi-
cal participation in the framework of European citizenship, even if the 
ECJ seems to have framed the boundaries of the exercise of the Member 
States’ freedom in this respect (see IV below).
II. The right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections: an 
important step but unfi nished move towards EU collective identity 
1. The growing but nonetheless contested idea of a Europe of citizens
While the founding fathers could not have imagined all the conse-
quences of their work, they were not unaware of the importance of the 
individual for the success of their aims.5 Almost twenty years after the 
5  See J Monnet, Mémoires (Fayard, Paris 1976) 427. See also R Kovar and D Simon, ‘La 
citoyenneté européenne’ (1993) CDE 285.
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signing of the Treaty of Rome, however, very little had been done to grant 
rights to individuals beyond the group of economically active migrants. 
The President of the Council at that time, and Belgian Prime Minister, Leo 
Tindemans, proclaimed in a famous report following the 1974 Paris Sum-
mit that a specifi c European citizenship was indispensable to consolidate 
the European project.6 Despite some initiatives of the Commission, the 
European Council and the EP, no consensus was reached before the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty. This failure is understandable from a historical point 
of view. At the end of the seventies and during the eighties, European 
citizenship was considered by ‘Eurosceptics’ as an extension of Europe 
far beyond the international scope of the founding Treaties. The internal 
market was then still largely ineffective and the settlement of rights com-
mon to all EU citizens, including electoral rights, was therefore no prior-
ity.7 The EP, with its ‘Seitlinger project’, recommended that the Member 
States grant their own nationals the right to vote in European elections 
wherever they resided in the Community. However, this recommendation 
was not binding.8 Some Member States improved their laws on this point, 
but always on grounds of isolated and spontaneous initiatives.9 In sum, 
the sole but nonetheless essential progress made during this period was 
the fi rst direct elections of the EP in 1979. As the 1976 Act concerning 
the Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct 
Universal Suffrage10 illustrates, this improvement was not accompanied 
6  See ‘Tindemans-report’ [1976] Bull.EC Suppl. 1/76 5-31.
7  See on this evolution C Wihtol de Wenden, ‘Les fondements de la citoyenneté européenne’ 
in S Leclerc and J-F Akandji-Kombé (eds), La citoyenneté européenne (Bruylant, Brussels 
2007) 25-26; A Connolly, S Day and J Shaw, ‘The Contested Case of EU Electoral Rights’ 
in R Bellamy, D Castiglione and J Shaw (eds), Making European Citizens. Civic Inclusion in 
a Transnational Context (Palgrave/MacMillan, New York 2006) 35-43; K Lenaerts, P Van 
Nuffel and R Bray (eds), Constitutional Law of the European Union (2nd edn Thomson - Sweet 
& Maxwell, London 2006) 541-543; J Pomoell, European Union Citizenship in Focus : the 
Legal Position of the Individual in EC Law (Helsinki University Press Forum Iuris, Helsinki 
2000) 78-80; L Le Hardÿ de Beaulieu, ‘Quelques propos sur la notion de citoyenneté euro-
péenne’ in L Le Hardÿ de Beaulieu (dir), L’Europe et ses citoyens. Actes du Colloque ‘Où en 
est l’Europe des citoyens? Vingt ans après l’élection du Parlement européen au suffrage uni-
versel’ (P.I.E. - Lang, Brussels 2000) 10-12; J-L Quermonne, Le système politique de l’Union 
européenne (Montchrestien, Paris 1998), 130-133; P Magnette, La citoyenneté européenne. 
Droits, politiques, institutions (Editions de l’U.L.B., Brussels 1999); P D’Argent, ‘Le droit de 
vote et d’éligibilité aux élections municipales et européennes comme attribut de la citoyen-
neté de l’Union’ (1993) Ann. Dr. Louv. 222-226.
8  [1983] OJ C 300/77.
9  This was the case in Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland. See PM 
Mabaka, Problèmes et perspectives constitutionnels du processus de l’intégration européenne 
- Aspects nationaux et européen (Ant. N. Sakoulas/Bruylant coll. Bibliothèque européenne, 
Athens/Brussels 2006) 196-198.
10  Annex to Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 relating to the 
Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suf-
frage [1978] OJ L278/1. This annex has since then been completed and amended by Deci-
sion 2002/772/CE-Euratom of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 [2002] OJ L283/1.
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by substantial EU political rights. In particular, there existed at that time 
no freedom of movement of voters in European elections.
2. Maastricht and EU citizenship
The Maastricht Treaty created a Union, an impetus for the devel-
opment of the collaborative projects of the Member States outside the 
traditional EC economy-linked policies. The spirit of this reform was to 
deeply enhance the common values not only of the Member States but 
also of their citizens. The latter were thus granted the offi cial status of 
European citizens by Article 17 EC. This provision stipulates moreover 
that, ‘[c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace na-
tional citizenship’. A large majority of authors interpreted this as mean-
ing that only EU nationals may benefi t from citizenship and the rights 
attaching to it.11 One of the prerogatives specifi cally linked to EU citizen-
ship is the right for each EU citizen to take part, whether actively or pas-
sively, in municipal and European elections in a Member State of which 
he/she is not a national and under the same conditions as nationals of 
that State. This holds true irrespective of the length of stay in the Member 
State of residence. An exception, however, was allowed for Luxemburg, 
where fi ve effective years of residence are required. This rule cannot be 
applied to EU citizens who have lost those electoral rights in the Member 
State where they are nationals simply because they reside outside the 
national territory.12 The fact that the new chapter on EU citizenship did 
not generalise the ‘free movement of the voters’ to all kinds of elections 
but rather limited its standards to municipal and European elections 
received much criticism. It was argued that an authentic political Union 
would have required that EU citizens should enjoy the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in all types of elections - regional and national - and 
irrespective of place of residence.13 
The EC Treaty adds that the EP represents the ‘peoples of the States 
brought together in the Community’14 and that ‘the assembly shall draw 
11  R Kovar and D Simon (n 5) 292; PM Mabaka (n 9) 194; R Mehdi, ‘Article II-99’ in L Bur-
gogue-Larsen, A Levade and F Picod, Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, com-
mentaire article par article. Partie II. La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union (Bruylant, 
Bruxelles 2005) 507-510. Cf L Le Hardÿ de Beaulieu (n 7) 13. This author admitted that 
a State was free to grant electoral rights at European elections to non EU citizens (see in 
particular n 8). 
12  Luxemburg Electoral Law of 18 February 2003 [2003] Rec. A-30 445-508 art 3 5° and 
285 para 1 4°. Forty-fi ve days of effective residence are required in the Czech Republic (Act 
62/2003, 18 February 2003).
13  See M Anderson, M Den Boer and G Miller, ‘European Citizenship and Cooperation in 
Justice and Home Affairs’ in A Duff, J Pinder and R Pryce (eds), Maastricht and Beyond. 
Building the European Union (Routeledge, London 1994) 111.
14  See Art 189 EC.
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up a proposal for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with 
a uniform procedure in all Member States or in accordance with princi-
ples common to all Member States’.15 Such a proposal requires unanimity 
in the Council. A directive was adopted on this legal base. This legislation 
settles basic rules to be applied by Member States in order not to dis-
criminate among EU citizens on grounds of nationality when organising 
European elections.16 Article 1 of this Directive leaves Member States free 
to limit the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections 
for their own citizens who reside in another Member State.17 As a result 
of the quite recent agreement of the United Kingdom to set aside its tra-
ditional principle of majority representation for the purpose of European 
elections, these have to be organised following the system of proportional 
representation.18 As for the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
this document simply repeats, on the one hand, the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in European elections fl owing from Article 19 EC 
and, on the other hand, the principle that European elections must be 
held according to universal, free and secret suffrage.19 
Signifi cantly also, as has already been mentioned, the case law of the 
ECtHR has now made clear that the granting of active and passive voting 
rights in European elections was no longer ancillary but compulsory for 
EU Member States, since they are members of the Council of Europe and, 
as a consequence, bound by the ECHR and its compulsory Protocols. 
This is both the result of Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the 
ECHR and of the EP competences under its legislative functions.20 
Such a conclusion does not mean that the Strasbourg Court obliges 
the Member States to grant foreigners such rights. It is still accepted that 
a State may exclude third-country nationals from elections.21 Active and 
15  See Art 190(4) EC. 
16  See Council Directive (EC) 93/109 of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrange-
ments for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are 
not nationals [1993] OJ L329/34. See for a deep analysis of this instrument N Clinchamps, 
Parlement européen et droit parlementaire. Essai sur la naissance du droit parlementaire 
de l’Union européenne (LGDJ, Paris 2006) 84-88. See also the recent proposal of the Com-
mission to amend Directive (EC) 93/109, especially in order to simplify the administrative 
procedures required to vote in European elections, COM(2006) 791 fi nal. 
17  One should not forget that those citizens will enjoy those rights in the Member State of 
residence, as a result of Art 19 EC.
18  See 1976 Act (n 10) Art 1.
19  See Art 39. This Charter has currently no binding force. See, however, ECJ Case C-
540/03 Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR I-5769 para 38. 
20  The Matthews judgment settled in this way an ancient controversy between the ECtHR 
and the now disappeared European Commission on Human Rights. See n 3.
21  See European Commission on Human Rights Case W, X, Y and Z v Belgium [1975] App 
n° 6745 and 6746/74; European Commission on Human Rights Case X v United Kingdom 
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passive voting rights of those nationals with dual-nationality can also be 
limited when rules of international private law lead to the consideration 
that the foreign nationality is the leading one.22 To some extent, and as 
explained below, such solutions are a consequence of Article 16 ECHR, 
which provides that ‘nothing in Article 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as 
preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the 
political activity of aliens’. However, the criterion of nationality is nowhere 
explicitly mentioned by the ECtHR. In other terms, the ECtHR refuses to 
express its broad consent of limitations of third-country nationals’ elec-
toral rights. This observation holds true for all types of elections, not only 
local or regional but also legislative ones. This could be an indication of 
the awareness of the ECtHR that the active participation of foreigners in 
public affairs is a normal evolution towards higher levels of democracy and 
human rights in Europe, even if in practice the nationality condition is still 
crucial for the States. Suffi ce it to note that old members of the Council of 
Europe, such as France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Germany, still exclude 
foreigners from most electoral processes, above all legislative ballots. This 
draws severe criticism from commentators, specifi cally in view of the evo-
lution initiated by European citizenship and the right of each national of 
a Member State of the EU to vote in municipal and European elections 
irrespective of his/her place of residence.23 Some argue that nothing can 
explain the refusal to grant non-EU citizens equal rights, at least when 
they have been residing in a Member State for a long time.24 
[1976] App n° 7566/76; European Commission on Human Rights Case X v United King-
dom [1979] App n° 7730/76; European Commission on Human Rights Case Luksch v Italy 
[1997] App n° 27614/95; ECtHR Case Hirst v United Kingdom [2005] App n° 74025/01 (see 
the dissenting opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens at paras 
4 and 8). See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello in the ECtHR Case Ždanoka v 
Latvia [2004] App n° 58278/00 para 4.3. This solution is not in contradiction with the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that foresees that ‘(e)very citizen shall have 
the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and 
without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors’ (emphasis added).
22  See European Commission on Human Rights Case Ganscher v Belgium [1996] App n° 
28858/95. See, however, for an opposing solution between EU Member States, ECJ Case 
C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239 para 15.
23  See G Goedertier and Y Haeck (n 3) 488. See also P Van Dijk and GJH Van Hoof, De 
Europese conventie in theorie en praktijk (Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen 1990) 1150-1151; S 
Leclerc, ‘Les droits du citoyen européen’, in S Leclerc and J-F Akandji-Kombé (eds), La ci-
toyenneté européenne (Bruylant, Brussels 2007) 77. See, however, B Renauld, ‘Le droit de 
vote des étrangers aux élections communales’ (2006) 31 JT 578. 
24  See the Code of good practice in electoral matters - Guidelines and explanatory report, 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 51st and 52nd 
sessions (2002) <www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)023rev-e.pdf> accessed 15 
March 2007. See also G Goedertier and Y Haeck (n 3). 
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3. The double lack of harmonisation regarding the elections of the 
EP: irreversible defi ciencies?
Two defi ciencies characterise current Community law in the context 
of the elections of the European Parliament. 
Firstly, no uniform electoral procedure nor a fortiori any constituen-
cy exists at EU level.25 The statement by the European Commission that 
European elections are organised following ‘common principles’ amongst 
the Member States is thus a little misleading.26 Each State rather con-
stitutes an area where a predefi ned number of seats must be attributed. 
Member States may choose to divide their territory into several regional 
constituencies for the purposes of elections to the EP.27 Almost all tech-
nical rules that regulate this election are elaborated at the level of the 
Member States.28 This can be illustrated by many examples. Although 
Member States recently agreed to share the proportional representation 
principle for the organisation of the European elections, they are almost 
free to give any practical content to it. As a matter of fact, there are to-
day almost as many proportional representation regimes as there are 
Member States.29 For instance, some States apply blocked list polls while 
others authorise the voter to give preference to several candidates on dif-
ferent lists (panachage). In accordance with the principle of subsidiarité, 
the minimum age required to stand as a candidate also varies from one 
Member State to another. For example, whereas in Denmark, Germa-
ny, Spain, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Finland it is suffi cient to be 
eighteen, in Greece, Italy and Cyprus candidates have to be twenty-fi ve. A 
third illustration concerns the fact that Member States are not obliged to 
organise, nor prevented from holding, elections to the EP simultaneously 
with other elections. Thus, in Belgium European elections take place the 
same Sunday as elections to the parliaments of the federal entities.30 This 
is feasible in practice because those assemblies, like the EP, have a fi ve-
year mandate. The opposite is true in Sweden where all internal elections 
(municipal and national) are organised every fourth year. 
Secondly, the identity of the benefi ciaries of EU electoral rights - 
whether for European or municipal elections - is broadly determined at 
25  See P Magnette (n 7) 92. See also G De Vries, ‘La procédure électorale uniforme du Par-
lement européen: un pas pour rapprocher l’Europe des citoyens’ (1996) 399 RMCUE 417 
to 421. 
26  European Commission Fourth Report on European Citizenship (1 May 2001 - 30 April 
2004) of 26 October 2004, COM(2004) 695 fi nal, 8.
27  See for example Belgium, the United Kingdom or Germany. 
28  See Decision 2002/772 (n 10) Preamble and Art 7.
29  See B Dollez, ‘Vingt-cinq modes de scrutin différents’ 2 June 2004, Le Figaro 6. 
30  See Act of 10 December 1998, MB of 31 December 1998.
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national level. Member States are exclusively competent to grant nation-
ality and they decide who enjoys EU citizenship.31 We will come back 
to this point when examining the delicate question of granting electoral 
rights to non-EU citizens. 
There have been some proposals to modify this situation. During 
their meeting in Tampere in 1999, the Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States expressed the wish to grant nationality of the State of 
residence to third-country nationals residing in the Community for a long 
period.32 A year later, the European Commission presented its project for 
‘civic citizenship’ which was to be inserted in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. The proposal did not directly deal with nationality is-
sues. Rather, it aimed at providing some EU citizenship rights to third-
country nationals, including the right to vote and stand as a candidate 
in European elections.33 Of course, the Commission’s proposal only fore-
saw the granting of such rights to foreigners who have been residing in 
a Member State for a minimum period. The degree of citizenship even 
progressed in accordance with the length of the stay in the EU. Several 
legislative resolutions of the EP shared those views.34 Those initiatives 
have not yet been followed by the Member States, and EU law remains 
silent on the ‘electoral status’ of third-country nationals. Thus, the direc-
tive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents makes no mention of their electoral rights35 since, according to 
the Commission itself, the European Community enjoys no competence 
in this fi eld.36
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,37 the viability of 
which is now doubtful, provides no evolution in this respect either. The 
fact that currently the EP barely represents European peoples but is widely 
31  This expressly results from a Declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty about the 
nationality of a Member State. This document provides that such questions are to be re-
solved only at national level. 
32  Conclusions of the European Council, Tampere, 15 and 16 October 1999, point III.21 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm> accessed 15 March 2007.
33  Communication of the European Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment of 22 November 2000 on a Community Immigration Policy, COM(2000)757 fi nal 21-
22.
34  See A5-0050/2000 [2000] OJ C377/344 n 19; A5-0223/2001 [2002] OJ C65E/267 n 
123; A5-0451/2002 [2004] OJ C038E/247 n 136; A5-0281/2003 [2004] OJ C076E/412 
n 130. Whereas the fi rst Resolution requires residence of at least fi ve years in a Member 
State, the three others only require three years.
35  [2004] OJ L16/44. 
36  Commission’s Proposal of 13 March 2001 for a Council Directive concerning the status 
of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, COM(2001)127 fi nal, 8.
37  [2004] OJ C310/1.
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made up of national delegations was not suffi cient to lever change.38 The 
Laeken Declaration, which created the Convention and formulated the 
main questions to be resolved by the next institutional reform, explicitly 
encouraged debate on the need to revise the regime governing European 
elections, for example by creating a homogeneous constituency at the EU 
level.39 The EP, following the Commission, proposed an application of this 
European electoral area for the election of ten percent of the members of 
the EP.40 The idea was not only to improve the visibility of the EP for EU 
citizens but also to form the Commission - at least partially - with Euro-
pean-calibre politicians who won their seat in the EP after a European 
electoral challenge. In other words, the establishment of a European con-
stituency and a more democratic composition of the Commission were 
supposed to increase people’s interest in EP elections.41 
The preparatory works of the Constitutional Treaty raised discussions 
on such issues. For instance, a debate was held on the rationalisation of 
the electoral procedure. This concerned three aspects, namely the crea-
tion of supranational constituencies made up of several Member States, 
grouped following cultural and linguistic affi nities, the drastic limitation of 
the number of candidates and seats to be attributed within the EP, and the 
establishment of a unique list made up of all candidates of a constituency 
and their preferential classifi cation by the voters.42 All of these proposals 
were rejected in the end. The sole progress made is the assertion in the text 
of the Constitutional Treaty that the EP is composed of ‘representatives of 
the Union’s citizens’.43 The reference made in Articles 189 and 190 EC to 
the ‘peoples of the States brought together in the Community’ is thus re-
placed by a more federalist and cohesive vision of EU citizenship. This is, 
however, a purely symbolic improvement. And even this symbolic upgrad-
ing is altered by the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty which recalls 
that ‘[the peoples of Europe], while remaining proud of their own national 
identities and history, […] are determined to transcend their former divi-
38  P Lamy and J Pisani-Ferry, The Europe We Want (Plon - Policy Network, Paris 2002) 75 
and 76.
39  Annex I to the Council conclusions [2001] SN 300/1/01 REV 23.
40  See A4-0212/98 [1998] OJ C292/66 and the Communication of the Commission of 4 
December 2002 on the institutional architecture for the European Union: peace, freedom, 
solidarity, COM(2002)728 fi nal 16. The Resolution of the Parliament was adopted on the 
basis of the so-called ‘Anastassopoulos’ report. 
41  See on this point the Legislative Resolution of the European Parliament of 12 June 2002 
on the draft Council Decision amending the Act concerning the election of representatives of 
the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/
ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 A5-0212/2002 [2003] OJ C261/306.
42  See CONV 585/03, CONTRIB 261, 27 February 2003. This project, presented by John 
Burton, is available at <www.register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/fr/03/cv00/cv00585fr03.pdf> 
accessed 15 March 2007. 
43  See Art I-20 (2). 
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sions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny’.44 For the 
rest, the Constitutional Treaty only repeats what already exists: EU citi-
zenship is additional to national citizenship and does not replace it;45 every 
EU citizen has the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European and 
municipal elections in his state of residence, under the same conditions 
as the nationals of this Member State;46 the members of the EP must be 
elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.47 In particu-
lar, no softening of the procedure for the harmonisation of the European 
elections can be found in the Constitutional Treaty.48 
Finally, and as already mentioned, the Constitutional Treaty makes 
no mention of electoral rights of third-country citizens. The problem of the 
electoral status of third-country nationals is nevertheless a fundamen-
tal one given the increasing immigration in western European countries. 
Some Member States have large non-national minorities which are almost 
completely excluded from any political participation. A good illustration 
of this is the situation of so-called non-citizens in Latvia, namely Soviet-
era immigrants who have not been granted Latvian citizenship since the 
restoration of Latvian independence in 1991.49 The sole evolution pro-
vided by the Constitutional Treaty in this respect consists of recognising 
the right of each person to good administration and the right of access 
to documents, irrespective of his/her nationality.50 Those rights complete 
the EC Treaty, which already granted rights for each person to refer cases 
of maladministration to the European Ombudsman and to petition the 
European Parliament.51 Nevertheless, the problem of the electoral rights 
of third-country citizens was addressed during the preparatory works of 
the European Convention. Following the calls made during earlier inter-
governmental conferences, some members of the Convention pondered 
potential evolutions regarding the political rights of third-country na-
44  Emphasis added. 
45  See Art I-10 (1).
46  See Art I-10 (2) b and II-99.
47  See Art I-20 (3).
48  See Art III-330 and Art III-126. Unanimity is required in the Council to adopt harmo-
nising measures. Finding a compromise is therefore extremely diffi cult with twenty-seven 
Member States, unless, perhaps, on purely technical aspects.
49  This category of persons represents approximately twenty percent of the Latvian popu-
lation. Similar problems exist in Estonia, even though the number of non-citizens in this 
country is less than ten percent. Moreover, non-citizens in Estonia have the right to vote 
in municipal elections, which is not the case in Latvia. See on these questions P Van Elsu-
wege, ‘Russian-Speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems of Integration at the 
Threshold of the European Union’ (2004) 20 ECMI Working Paper, 49-51 <www.ecmi.de> 
accessed 15 March 2007. 
50  See Art III-101 and 102.
51  See Art II-103 and 104.
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tionals legally residing in the European Union. Kaufmann and Carnero 
(members of the EP) and Borell and Garrido (members of the Spanish 
Parliament) argued that EU citizenship should be granted directly by the 
Constitution to third-country nationals who have been residing in Europe 
for a long period.52 Berès, Duhamel, Paciotti and Van Lancker (members 
of the EP), and Floch (member of the French Assemblée Nationale) rather 
supported the inscription in the text of the Constitution of a possibility 
in this sense.53 Other proposals were to confer EU citizenship on state-
less persons and refugees.54 The divergent views of the Member States 
made it impossible to reach a compromise in this respect. Spain even 
declared in an annex to the Constitutional Treaty that ‘only nationals of 
Member States are entitled to the specifi c rights of European citizenship 
unless Union law expressly provides otherwise’.55 Accordingly, not only 
EU citizenship as a global concept but also all specifi c rights linked to it 
are exclusively granted to EU nationals. This would be the case for active 
and passive electoral rights in European and municipal elections.56 Civic 
citizenship defended by the Commission was thus rejected. 
III. The role of the ECJ in identifying persons who enjoy the right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elections: fi rst 
jurisprudential indications 
Now that the framework of European (political) citizenship has been 
described, it is important to come back to the judgments of the ECJ 
of September 2006 and to assess their impact on EU electoral rights. 
Both cases raise interesting problems. The fi rst concerns access to active 
and passive electoral rights for third-country nationals (I). The second 
revolves around the possibility for Member States to exclude their own 
citizens from those rights because they do not reside in their national 
territory (II).
1. Are Member States free to grant third-country nationals the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate at European elections? 
Case C-145/04 directly follows the famous and much commented 
Matthews judgment of the ECtHR.57 In the Matthews judgment, the EC-
52  See Proposed amendments VII(1)7 and VII(2)12 <www.european-convention.eu.int> ac-
cessed 15 March 2007. 
53  See Proposed amendments VII(1)18 and VII(2)6. 
54  See Proposed amendments VII(1)13 (J Voggenhuber and E Lichtenberger) and VII(1)16 
(M Nagy). 
55  Declaration 47 by the Kingdom of Spain on the defi nition of the term ‘nationals’.
56  The United Kingdom made a Declaration (N° 48) to the contrary.
57  See n 3.
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tHR confi rmed that a Member State of the EU can be held responsible 
for a breach of the ECHR by a provision of EU primary law if that pri-
mary law provision is incapable of existing without the consent of all 
Member States.58 The facts were as follows: Mrs Matthews, a British citi-
zen, was excluded from voting in European elections because she lived 
in Gibraltar. This was the result of an Annex to the 1976 Act related to 
European elections, which forbids the United Kingdom from organising 
them outside its own territory59 even though Community law applies in 
Gibraltar, since this is a territory for whose external relations UK is re-
sponsible.60 Mrs Matthews had brought an action before national courts 
without obtaining any satisfaction, and so brought her case before the 
ECtHR in Strasbourg. Her main argument was that the United Kingdom 
had breached her right to free elections guaranteed by Article 3 of the 
First Additional Protocol to the ECHR. 
After having lost the case before the ECtHR, the United Kingdom 
made efforts to obtain, if not the total removal, at least an amendment of 
the Annex. Spain, however, persisted in refusing any change in this re-
spect for political and historical reasons. Consequently, during a meeting 
of the Council of 18 February 2002, the United Kingdom declared that 
all necessary modifi cations of its legislation would be made in according 
with the requirements of the Matthews judgment. 
The European Parliament Representation Act 2003 was thus adopt-
ed. This law binds Gibraltar to an existing constituency in the United 
Kingdom61 and, furthermore, this Member State grants the right to vote 
and to stand as a candidate in European elections not only to EU citizens 
- including British citizens - but also to certain Commonwealth citizens 
who are not nationals of an EU country, namely ‘QCCs’. 
Spain refused to accept this extension. It fi rstly complained before 
the European Commission, which considered the case too politically 
sensitive to receive a clear-cut answer.62 Spain then brought the United 
Kingdom before the ECJ to obtain recognition of UK’s failure to respect 
EC law. It is important to distinguish the two legal arguments invoked 
by Spain.
58  In other terms, the contested norm would not exist should the Member State in question 
not have accepted it.
59  This was before Annex II but it became Annex I after the renumbering operated by the 
Council Decision of 25 June and 23 September 2002, above n 10. In the rest of the text, we 
shall speak, for clarity, of Annex I.
60  Art 299(4) EC.
61  In the United Kingdom, several electoral constituencies exist for the purposes of Euro-
pean elections. 
62  See the Declaration of the College of the European Commission of 29 October 2003, 
Press Release IP/03/1479. 
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The Kingdom of Spain argued with its fi rst means of action that the 
EC Treaty as such forbids a Member State from granting third-country 
nationals EU citizenship rights. According to the Kingdom of Spain, the 
ECJ should take into account - when deciding whether a QCC could 
have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at European elections in 
Gibraltar - the declaration made by the United Kingdom itself in 1982 
on the defi nition of the term ‘nationals’ for the purposes of EC law.63 Yet, 
the United Kingdom was not disputing that QCCs are not within the cat-
egories set out in this Declaration. Spain wanted to use this fact to deny 
QCCs any voting rights in European elections. Spain then relied on the 
narrow link between, on the one hand, Articles 17 and 19 EC combined 
with the notion of EU citizenship, with, on the other hand, the national-
ity of a Member State. Articles 189 and 190 EC, which describe the EP 
as an assembly made up of representatives of the ‘peoples of the States 
brought together in the Community’, would confi rm this conclusion. This 
is consistent with the general thrust of commentators at the time on the 
introduction of EU citizenship in the EC Treaty: surely the fact that the 
EC Treaty grants EU citizenship to nationals of the Member States and 
enumerates a list of rights linked to it necessarily means that those rights 
belong exclusively to EU nationals. 
However, both the Advocate General Tizzano and the ECJ have re-
jected this argument.64 The ECJ argues that the 1982 Declaration made 
by the United Kingdom, although important, only concerned the scope of 
those provisions of the EC Treaty that refer to the concept of ‘national’, 
such as the provisions relating to the freedom of movement of persons. 
Contrary to what the Kingdom of Spain argued, this Declaration could 
not therefore be used to prevent the extension of EU voting rights to 
QCCs when residing in Gibraltar.65 Moreover, besides the fact that the 
‘people’ is a vague concept from which no unambiguous conclusion is 
possible, Article 19 EC only deals with the electoral rights of EU citizens 
who are freely circulating within the Union. This provision does not con-
cern the political rights of third-country nationals. Article 17 EC, for its 
part, only means that the status of national of a Member State confers 
EU citizenship in principle. Again, the purpose of this article is not to ex-
clude non-EU citizens from Union citizenship. Nor is it to forbid a Mem-
ber State from granting EU citizenship rights to third-country nationals. 
This would be confi rmed, implicitly, by the EC Treaty itself when it grants 
63  This would follow from the judgment of the ECJ in Kaur. See ECJ Case C-192/99 Kaur 
[2001] ECR I-1237 para 24.
64  Conclusions of AG Tizzano of 6 April 2006 in Cases C-145/04 and C-300/04, paras 72 
to 93. See also Case C-145/04 (n 2) 66 to 80.
65  Case 145/04 para 75.
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each person, irrespective of his/her nationality, the right to petition the 
EP or to refer cases of maladministration to the European Ombudsman. 
The Court adds a more practical consideration. Were a Member State 
to grant citizens of third-countries the right to vote and to stand as candi-
dates in European elections, this would in no way affect the proportional 
importance of this State within the EP. The same holds true for the size 
and the identity of other Member States’ delegations in the EP. Consider-
ing that Member States are - as mentioned above - almost totally free to 
organise elections to the EP, and also that this kind of evolution is not 
prejudicial to the other parties to the EC/EU Treaties, the conclusion 
must be that Member States may recognise the right of third-country 
nationals to take part in elections to the EP.66 The consequent possibil-
ity that a third-country national might take a seat as a Member of the 
European Parliament is not analysed by the ECJ. In all probability, the 
Court was aware of this possibility but it did not consider this curtailed 
the Member States’ freedom in this fi eld. 
Whereas the ECJ refuses to forbid Member States from developing 
the political status of third-country nationals, it emphasises that this 
freedom is not absolute. The ECJ considers that the people who are 
granted such electoral rights must have a close link with the Member 
State in question67 and that in any case the Member States must observe 
Community law and the classical principles of equality and proportional-
ity. Furthermore, the ECJ seems to have been infl uenced by the consti-
tutional tradition of the United Kingdom.68 All this shows that the Court 
is certainly conscious that granting non-EU citizens electoral rights is a 
particularly sensitive question and that it therefore cannot be too liberal 
in this respect. The Advocate General went a step further. He asserted 
that third-country nationals could only be granted voting rights at Eu-
ropean elections in ‘exceptional circumstances’.69 Although the Advocate 
General did not explain exactly what those circumstances are, this is go-
ing too far in my opinion. This could mean that a Member State is not 
free to grant immigrants who have been legally resident in its territory for 
a long period the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European 
elections. Such a restrictive solution runs counter to the subsidiary char-
acter of the main part of the European Parliament election’s procedure, 
66  Ibid para 77. 
67  Ibid para 76.
68  Ibid paras 63 and 79. The emphasis of the Court on this element means in particular 
that there exists no common point of view between the EU Member States to grant third-
country nationals a harmonised political status. As a consequence, no redefi nition of fun-
damental rights is possible through Art 6(2) EU. This constitutional tradition had already 
been noticed by the ECJ in the Kaur judgment. See above n 62 para 20.
69  Para 103 of the conclusions.
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but also the increasing tendency to grant third-country nationals possi-
bilities to have their views taken into account at the political level. 
The second ground invoked by Spain raises more diffi cult questions. 
Annex I of the 1976 Act limits the European Parliament elections in the 
United Kingdom to the sole territory of this Member State. Its overseas 
zones of infl uence were therefore excluded. As mentioned above, the EC-
tHR declared that this limitation breached the right to free elections in 
Gibraltar, an area where Community law is applicable. Consequently, 
European Parliament elections had to be organised by the United King-
dom on this territory. Spain claimed, however, that this judgment did not 
imply an extension of the European Parliament election to QCCs, who are 
not British citizens. The United Kingdom could only breach primary law 
(the Annex) when this is necessary for the protection of a fundamental 
right, according to Article 6(2) EU. Current interpretation of the ECHR 
and its Protocols, in particular Article 3 of the First Protocol, still al-
lows States to apply nationality conditions in electoral matters. This also 
holds true for legislative polls. Since QCCs are not citizens of the United 
Kingdom for the purposes of the elections, the United Kingdom could not 
proceed with the extension. 
Contrary to the fi rst ground of action, the Advocate General and the 
ECJ defend opposite views here. Whereas the fi rst almost totally agrees 
with Spain’s reasoning,70 the ECJ argues that if the United Kingdom ex-
tended the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elec-
tions to QCCs, this was in order ‘to enable the Gibraltar electorate to 
vote in elections to the European Parliament as part of and on the same 
terms as the electorate of an existing United Kingdom constituency’. The 
United Kingdom therefore modifi ed its legislation ‘to comply with the re-
quirements resulting from those “same terms”’.71 In rather terse terms, 
the Court then concludes that the United Kingdom’s extension does not 
breach Community law. Why did the ECJ reject Spain’s argument? In my 
opinion, this solution cannot be the direct result of the Matthews judg-
ment of the ECtHR:72 indeed, and as already mentioned, this case only 
concerned British nationals who reside in Gibraltar. Therefore, it did not 
impose as such that the United Kingdom grant the QCCs residing in Gi-
braltar voting rights in the European elections. Although it is not obvious 
in the terms of the judgment itself, the Court seems aware nevertheless 
that QCCs are granted voting rights in European elections when they re-
side in the United Kingdom itself. If the United Kingdom had not allowed 
the QCCs to take part in elections to the EP in Gibraltar, this would have 
70  Ibid para 128.
71  Case C-145/04 paras 91 and 93.
72  Compare L Burgogue-Larsen (n 2) 41-43.
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meant that the QCCs could in the future have lost those voting rights 
when residing in the United Kingdom. In other words, any solution other 
than extending EU voting rights to the QCCs in Gibraltar could have been 
discriminatory among the QCCs themselves.73 Contrary to the argumen-
tation of Advocate General Tizzano, a departure from the requirements of 
the Annex could be therefore indispensable to the protection of a funda-
mental right, i.e. the non-discrimination principle.74 
This explains why several British members of the EP, including Glyn 
Ford, Neil Parish, Graham Watson and Roger Knapman, applauded the 
judgment of the ECJ not only because it allows the United Kingdom to 
grant QCCs residing in Gibraltar voting rights in European elections, but 
fi rst of all because it protects those electoral rights for QCCs residing in 
the United Kingdom.75 In other words, QCCs are not British citizens and 
thus cannot demand the automatic right to vote and to stand as a can-
didate in European elections on the basis of Article 3 of the First Proto-
col. Nevertheless, whenever they are under the ‘jurisdiction’ of a Member 
State of the Council of Europe they enjoy the guaranteed right of equal 
treatment under Article 14 ECHR. 
One objection could be that Article 16 ECHR provides that ‘[n]othing 
in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Con-
tracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of al-
iens’. This article confi rms that limitations to the political rights of non-
nationals are in principle admissible. This provision must be nevertheless 
correctly understood. As is widely confi rmed by the case law of the EC-
tHR, it means that the nationality criterion is not discriminatory regard-
ing electoral matters. Yet to my mind, Article 16 could not be used to jus-
tify discriminatory rules within a category of third-country nationals. In 
such a case, the question is no longer about restrictions to their political 
rights, but about a coherent policy in political matters. It would hardly 
be acceptable to grant some third-country nationals political rights while 
at the same time refusing those rights to other third-country nationals 
who are objectively in the same situation, for example because of their 
common historical link with the State of residence. Anyway, and more 
fundamentally, the ECJ was free and was even encouraged to provide a 
higher protection of fundamental rights than that required by the ECHR 
and its protocols. In its Bosphorus judgment, the ECtHR went so far as 
73  Ibid para 79. For a summary of the argument of the United Kingdom in this respect, see 
also para 47. For another explanation of the Court’s solution, mainly based on the 2002 
Declaration, see M Claes (n 2) 217.
74  See contra A Dawes (n 2) 712.
75  V Miller, Gibraltar: diplomatic and constitutional developments (House of Commons Li-
brary, International Affairs and Defence Section, Research Paper 06/48, London 2006) 41 
and 42.
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not to control the activity of EU institutions, provided EU law guarantees 
an ‘equivalent protection’ of fundamental rights.76 This last element has 
also certainly been a contributory factor in the thinking of the ECJ when 
it avoids being too explicit in its fi nal ratio decidendi. Faced with such a 
delicate question of discrimination in the fi eld of political rights, the ECJ 
has protected the Community legal order by giving precedence to the so-
lution which most protects fundamental rights without going to any great 
lengths to explain why. 
2. Can EU citizens residing outside the Union be excluded from 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament?
This second question is related to the Eman & Sevinger case (Case 
C-300/04). In its judgment, the ECJ entirely followed the Advocate Gen-
eral.77 Here, the legal exclusion of certain Dutch State citizens residing 
in Aruba, an island belonging to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, from 
the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections was at 
stake. An important feature of the case is that those rights were recog-
nised for Dutch nationals residing abroad but other than in Aruba or the 
Dutch Antilles. 
The ECJ decided in Eman & Sevinger that citizenship rights are 
available in principle to all Member States’ nationals, even when they 
reside outside the Community.78 This was a reply to the Dutch govern-
ment’s argument that EU citizenship rights should only be available on 
the territory of the Community.79 Beyond this general contention, the 
ECJ again considers that the identifi cation of the holders of the right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in European elections currently be-
longs to each Member State in compliance with Community law.80 In the 
absence of common rules, it is for the Member States to adopt the rules 
76  ECtHR Case Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turzim ve Ticaret Anonim S̨irketi v Ireland (2005) App 
n° 45036/98. See S Adam and F Krenc, ‘La responsabilité des Etats membres de l’Union euro-
péenne devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme’ (2006) 6 JT 85-87 and A Hinerajos 
Parga, ‘Bosphorus v. Ireland and the protection of fundamental rights in Europe’ (2006) 31 EL 
Rev 259. See also, for a good example of the self-restraint of the ECJ, Case C-36/02 Omega 
Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609 and the comments of T Ackermann (2005) 42 CML Rev. 1107 
to 1120 and A Alemanno, ‘A la recherche d’un équilibre entre libertés fondamentales et droits 
fondamentaux dans le cadre du marché intérieur’ (2004) 4 Revue du droit de l’Union europée-
nne 709 to 751. Compare with ECJ Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279.
77  See para 168 of the conclusions of AG Tizzano. 
78  According to the ECJ, answering the fi rst question asked by the Raad van State, Dutch 
citizens residing in Aruba ‘may rely on the rights conferred on citizens of the Union in Part 
Two of the Treaty’. See ECJ Case C-300/04 para 29.
79  Ibid para 25.
80  Ibid para 45. See also Case C-145/04 para 78.
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which are best adapted to their constitutional structure.81 The circum-
stance that some States - like France - organise European elections in 
overseas countries where Community law does not apply entirely is not 
a reason to make this practice compulsory for the other Member States. 
Furthermore, such rights can be subject to conditions.82 Whereas EC law 
does not apply in Aruba - the territory where Eman and Sevinger reside - 
Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR does not apply in this case.83 As 
a consequence, the applicants cannot require the Netherlands to provide 
them with active and passive voting rights in European elections. The 
ECJ recalls here the case law of the ECtHR according to which limitations 
to political rights through residence criteria are not contrary to the ECHR 
and its protocols as such.84 
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the ECJ observes that ‘the princi-
ple of equal treatment prevents […] the criteria chosen from resulting in 
different treatment of nationals who are in comparable situations, un-
less that difference in treatment is objectively justifi ed’. According to the 
Court, the Netherlands did not suffi ciently justify why they allow all their 
citizens residing abroad to take part in the European elections, except 
those residing in the Dutch Antilles or in Aruba.85 In comparison with the 
judgment in Case C-145/04, the ECJ analysed more explicitly the con-
formity of national legislation with the non-discrimination principle. Ad-
mittedly, the fundamental rights question here was easier to solve than 
in the Gibraltar case. Anyway, both judgments provide a high level of 
protection of fundamental rights, especially regarding the non-discrimi-
nation principle.
In its judgment following the preliminary ruling of the ECJ, the Dutch 
supreme administrative court confi rmed the illegality of this exclusion. The 
Dutch authorities failed again to provide any objective justifi cation for the 
difference in treatment.86 However, according to this judgment, it is for the 
Dutch political authorities to decide on a solution in the future, and any-
way before the next elections to the EP in 2009. This solution might not 
necessarily imply that Dutch citizens residing in Aruba would be granted 
the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections, provided 
that the discrimination issue is solved. Moreover, the judgment made it 
clear that the illegality was limited to the sole provisions of Dutch law re-
lated to elections to the EP and did not extend to national elections. 
81  Ibid para 50.
82  Ibid paras 52 and 53.
83  Ibid paras 48 to 50. 
84  See ECtHR Case Melnitchenko v Ukraine (2005) App n° 17707/02. See also ECtHR case 
Hilbe v Liechtenstein (1999) App n° 31981/96.
85  Case C-300/04 paras 60 and 61.
86  Raad v. State 21 Nov 2006, 200404446/1 & 200404450/1 para 2.3.1.
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It is important here to mention that Eman and Sevinger had brought 
a parallel case before the Dutch supreme administrative court, com-
plaining against their exclusion from voting rights in the election of the 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (Second National Chamber of the 
Netherlands).87 The reason for the refusal was that they had not been 
residing in the Netherlands for a minimum period of ten years. The link 
with the Netherlands would be therefore too weak to grant Eman and Se-
vinger active and passive voting rights for the appointment of the Second 
National Chamber. Again, Dutch citizens not residing in Aruba or in the 
Dutch Antilles were granted those rights, even if they had never resided 
in the Netherlands. The Dutch supreme administrative court rejected the 
claims. According to its judgment, Eman and Sevinger could participate 
in the election of the parliamentary organ of Aruba, which is widely in-
volved in the legislative process of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.88 The 
situation of Dutch citizens residing in the Netherlands and in Aruba is 
therefore different regarding ‘national’ elections, so that no discrimina-
tion can be identifi ed.89 
This result was opposite to what the Raad van State had decided 
in the case concerning European elections. The reason for this discrep-
ancy lies precisely in the difference between the two situations that must 
be compared in both cases.90 In the case concerning national elections, 
both categories of Dutch citizens did not elect the same legislative organ: 
the representative organs of Aruba or the Dutch Antilles when the vot-
ers resided in those territories,91 and the Second National Chamber of 
the Netherlands in other cases. On the contrary, in the case concerning 
European elections, the sole election at stake was that to the EP. Even 
if Community law did not apply outside the Netherlands, the difference 
introduced by Dutch law regarding European elections between Dutch 
citizens living in Aruba and the Dutch Antilles on one hand and those liv-
ing abroad but not in those territories on the other hand92 was therefore 
discriminatory because it concerned the same legislative organ and was 
not justifi ed on suffi cient objective grounds.
87  Raad v. State 21 Nov 2006, 200607567/1 & 200607800/1. See also M Claes (n 2) 
218.
88  Ibid para 2.3.2.
89  Ibid paras 2.3.3. and 2.4.1.
90  Between Dutch citizens residing in Aruba or the Dutch Antilles on the one hand and 
those who do not live in the Netherlands but live elsewhere, other than in Aruba or the 
Dutch Antilles on the other hand. 
91  These people could also participate in the election of the Second National Chamber of the 
Netherlands if they had resided for at least ten years in the Netherlands.
92  See Case 300/04 para 58.
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IV. A comparison between ‘economic-oriented’ and ‘political-oriented’ 
rights linked to EU citizenship: a several-speed Europe of citizens?
The recent case law of the ECJ regarding elections to the EP raises 
once again questions as to the coherence of European citizenship as a 
whole.93 A comparison between those judgments and the case law of the 
ECJ revolving around ‘economic-oriented’ freedoms results in quite a 
paradoxical picture: on the one hand the Court underlines the existence 
of a specifi c European citizenship, which undoubtedly is signifi cant in 
the sphere of political rights such as the right to petition, the passive and 
active right to take part in elections to the EP, etc.; on the other hand, the 
Court shows restraint when defi ning the scope of those EU citizenship 
‘political’ rights.
Before entering into this discussion, let us make an observation as 
to the principle itself of the intervention of the ECJ in cases like Spain v. 
United Kingdom and Eman & Sevinger. Certainly, these judgments con-
cerned purely internal situations, even though they related to the condi-
tions of enjoyment of Community voting rights. Contrary to most of the 
following judgments linked to the four Community freedoms, there was 
no cross-border element here that ‘naturally’ justifi ed the intervention of 
the Court of Justice. After all, Art 19(2) EC only provides that ‘every citi-
zen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national 
shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the 
European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the 
same conditions as nationals of that State’.94 The ECJ therefore had may-
be less room for manoeuvre when faced with situations where, as was the 
case in both of the commented judgments, no EU citizen was deprived of 
a Community right when travelling within the Union. 
 Admittedly, however, the right to vote and stand as a candidate in 
European elections is independent of any movement within the Union. As 
mentioned, voting rights in European elections are a result not of the EC 
Treaty itself but of the 1976 Act on the Election of the Representatives of 
the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage, which completed 
the founding treaties.95 According to this Act, each EU citizen enjoys the 
right to vote and stand as a candidate in European elections when resid-
ing in a territory where the EP is a legislative organ, under the conditions 
established by the European Council and the Member States themselves. 
No condition other than possessing the nationality of a Member State is 
93  See also S Wernicke, ‘Au nom de qui? The European Court of Justice Between Member 
States, Civil Society and Union Citizens’ (2007) 3 ELJ. 384-386.
94  Emphasis added. The ECJ insisted on the limited scope of this provision in the Gibraltar 
Case. See Case C-145/04 para 66.
95  See n 10.
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required to enjoy these EU citizenship rights, especially not a cross-bor-
der element. Thus, in my opinion, the competence of the ECJ to give a 
preliminary ruling in the Dutch case and to assess the compliance of the 
United Kingdom’s EPRA with Community law could not be questioned.96 
This is all the more true since Art 220 EC as such does not subordinate 
the competence of the ECJ to any cross-border requirement. 
1. EU Citizenship rights before the ECJ: discrepancies between the 
freedoms of movement and of residence and EU electoral rights?
The freedoms of movement and of residence are essential Commu-
nity rights. They are not only qualifi ed as citizenship rights set out in part 
two of the EC Treaty, but occupy an essential position within the Treaty 
chapters devoted to Community policies. The role played by the ECJ in 
establishing the Union’s constitutional foundations has been signifi cant 
in interpreting these rights. Several cases illustrate this observation. 
The freedoms of movement and of residence were basically only ap-
plicable to persons exercising an economic activity. The ECJ has nev-
ertheless construed this condition broadly. In its Franca Ninni-Orasche 
judgment, for example, the ECJ considered that employment of two and 
a half months could be classed as an economic activity ‘provided that 
the activity performed as an employed person is not purely marginal and 
ancillary’.97 
But even in those cases where a person does not exercise an eco-
nomic activity, the ECJ has given a wide interpretation to Articles 12, 17 
and 18 EC.98 The ECJ only makes use of these provisions when other 
Treaty bases - such as Articles 39 or 43 EC - are not applicable.99 In 
D’Hoop, a case about students, the ECJ decided that EU citizenship ‘pre-
cludes a Member State from refusing to grant the tideover allowance to 
one of its nationals, a student seeking her fi rst employment, on the sole 
ground that that student completed her secondary education in another 
Member State’.100 In the Baumbast judgment, the Court added that the 
freedoms of movement and of residence are only admissible when the 
citizens in question do not represent an ‘unreasonable burden on the 
96  An author criticised the ECJ for not having explained the grounds of its competence in 
these cases. See M Claes (n 2) 216.
97  See ECJ Case C-413/01 Franca Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-13187 para 32.
98  See M Dougan, ‘The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship’ 
(2006) 5 EL Rev 613-641.
99  See for example ECJ Case C-258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275 paras 20 and follow-
ing.
100  See ECJ Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191 para 40. 
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public fi nances of the host State’.101 The Trojani case concerned persons 
who were not studying or exercising an economic activity but who had 
worked in their country of residence in the past.102 The Court introduced 
a distinction here between the residence of EU citizens and the grant-
ing of social rights to persons whose right to live in their Member State 
of residence is not contested. Whereas in the fi rst case the criterion of 
economic dependence can validate limitations of the right to freely reside 
in another Member State, in the second case such a limitation must be 
considered as discrimination on the grounds of nationality, which is for-
bidden by Article 12 EC. This case law has been confi rmed in the Bidar 
case concerning a French student who was legally resident in the United 
Kingdom. As a result of his French nationality, the United Kingdom re-
fused to grant him fi nancial assistance to cover his maintenance costs 
during his university studies. The ECJ decided that the English system 
breached the non-discrimination principle contained in Article 12 EC.103 
More generally, the ECJ sanctions Member States when they discour-
age their own non-economically active citizens to be a resident of another 
Member State by subordinating the granting of an advantage to the condi-
tion that they reside on the national territory. Apart from the D’Hoop case 
above, the Pusa case also illustrates this ban. In this case, a disadvanta-
geous fi scal regime applied to nationals residing abroad was the subject of 
contention.104 Another good example is the Tas-Hagen case concerning the 
refusal to grant an allowance to civilians who are victims of war but who 
reside outside their national territory.105 The Morgan and Bucher cases, 
still pending, raise identical problems concerning students who wish to 
receive fi nancial aid from their Member State but who study abroad.106
101  See ECJ Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091 paras 90 and 94.
102  See ECJ Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573 para 33.
103  See ECJ Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-3119 paras 42 to 44.
104  See ECJ Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-4763 para 19. 
105  See ECJ Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen [2006] ECR I-10451 para 40. An almost similar 
question is currently pending before the ECJ concerning the granting by Poland of an allow-
ance to victims of concentration camps. This country excludes from this advantage people 
residing in another State, be it an EU Member State or not (ECJ Case C-499/06 Nerkowska 
still pending). In its Baldinger judgment, which concerned a limitation of war allowances to 
nationals, the Court interpreted the question asked by the national judge in a quite surpris-
ingly restrictive way. The Court answered that such a national limitation was not contrary 
to the freedom of movement of migrant workers. It is true that the question concerned only 
the applicability of article 39(2) EC to Mr Baldinger and a direct discrimination. However, 
the ECJ did not assess whether Mr Baldinger could win his proceedings by invoking citi-
zenship rights, amongst which the non-discrimination principle of article 12 EC (ECJ Case 
C-386/02 Baldinger [2004] ECR I-8411). AG Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer concluded on 
the contrary that Art 12 EC forbade that a Member State applies the nationality criterion 
in granting war allowances.
106  See ECJ Case C-11/06 Morgan, still pending and ECJ Case C-12/06 Bucher, pending. 
See the conclusions of AG Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer issued on 20 March 2007.
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Furthermore, the ECJ judged in the above-mentioned Micheletti case 
that the sole fact that a national of a Member State holds the nationality 
of a third-country is no reason to refuse him/her the benefi t of Commu-
nity law, especially the right to freely move within the Union.107 According 
to the ECJ, ‘the provisions of Community law on freedom of establish-
ment preclude a Member State from denying a national of another Mem-
ber State who possesses at the same time the nationality of a non-mem-
ber country entitlement to that freedom on the ground that the law of the 
host State deems him to be a national of the non-member country’. This 
conclusion is not affected by the circumstance that nationality policies 
are part of Member States’ competences.108 In other terms, a Member 
State cannot invoke its own rules of private international law to exclude 
the application of the Community freedoms of movement to bi-nationals 
who have the nationality of a Member State. The same conclusion ap-
plies a fortiori to EU citizens who are simultaneously nationals of several 
Member States.109 A similar reasoning can be found in the Saldanha case, 
which concerned the requirement by Austria of a guarantee of coverage of 
procedural costs from foreigners who are plaintiffs in proceedings before 
Austrian courts,110 and in the Zhu & Chen case, where the freedom of 
residence of a Community national was at stake.111 As well summarised 
in the famous Grzelczyk judgment,
‘Union citizenship is [therefore] destined to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who fi nd 
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law 
irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are 
expressly provided for’.112
In the fi eld of electoral rights, the ECJ rather observes that nation-
ality questions are still a matter for national competence. It is therefore 
currently for the Member States to determine who enjoys active and pas-
sive voting rights in European elections, and this in compliance with 
Community law. This implies that in principle the Member States may 
grant citizens of third-countries such rights or exclude their own citi-
zens residing outside Europe from benefi ting from them. However, and 
as already mentioned, the recent judgments of the ECJ do not grant the 
107  See n 22 para 15. 
108  Ibid para 10.
109  See ECJ Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613 paras 22 to 29. See T Ack-
ermann (2007) 1 CML Rev 141-154.
110  See ECJ Case C-122/96 Saldanha [1997] ECR I-5325 para 30.
111  See ECJ Case C-200/02 Zhu & Chen [2004] ECR I-9925.
112  ECJ Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193 para 31.
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Member States total freedom in this respect.113 The extension of voting 
rights to non-EU citizens seems to be possible only when a close link can 
be identifi ed with the Member State in question. Furthermore, the ECJ 
in its recent judgments apparently took into account the constitutional 
tradition of the United Kingdom and the specifi c state structure of the 
Netherlands, although it is not clear whether and to what extent the ECJ 
considers such peculiarities to be a real condition for any differentia-
tion in European voting rights.114 Anyway, a limitation of these rights on 
grounds of residence criteria is only acceptable in accordance with the 
general principles of Community law, especially the non-discrimination 
principle.
Nevertheless, this relative prudence on the part of the ECJ is not the 
result of any shyness. This is rather the consequence of the lack of con-
sensus among Member States to determine precisely who benefi ts from 
the voting rights in European elections. This lack of consensus about 
the political aspects of EU citizenship is well illustrated by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, intended as the fi rst autonomous corpus of human 
rights of the EC/EU. Contrary to electoral rights, this Charter expressly 
provides that ‘freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in 
accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community, to 
nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member 
State’.115 A comparable provision concerning electoral rights has neither 
been inserted in the Charter nor in the Constitutional Treaty. This could 
mean that whereas the freedoms to move and to reside within the Union 
are natural Community rights and could even be extended to third-coun-
try nationals, voting rights, because of their political sensitivity, remain 
essentially a matter of national competence. 
2. An ‘à la carte’ EU citizenship? Realism in the analysis of the 
consequences of Spain v United Kingdom and Eman & Sevinger
The foregoing developments might give the impression of an à la 
carte EU citizenship, determined according to the type of right and the 
place where it is invoked.116 Singularly, the case law of the ECJ seems to 
113  See also the conclusions of the AG Tizzano para 64.
114  In the Gibraltar case, the ECJ seems to have been sensitive to the fact that the exten-
sion of voting rights to QCCs was also foreseen for national elections. See Case 145/04 
para 79.
115  Art 45(2). See for an application Directive (EC) 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the ter-
ritory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Direc-
tives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [1993] OJ L229/35.
116  F Kauff-Gazin (n 2) 9.
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be more far-reaching when dealing with the freedoms of movement than 
when fi xing some boundaries of the Member States’ freedom regarding 
EU electoral rights. But the consequences of the judgments of the ECJ 
dated 12 September 2006 should not be exaggerated. 
Firstly, as already noted, the ECJ does not give the Member States 
complete freedom when defi ning the groups of persons enjoying vot-
ing rights in European elections. The core groups of benefi ciaries are 
no doubt Member States’ nationals, and any exception to this principle 
seems to be subordinated to some specifi c explanation. It is not relevant 
to repeat here the reasoning of the ECJ. 
A second reason is that, contrary to Kauff-Gazin’s assertion, in my 
opinion those judgments do not change anything in the Micheletti case 
law.117 The ECJ has indeed suffi ciently emphasised the scope of the re-
cent judgments: they concern only purely political rights, such as the 
right to vote or to stand as a candidate in European elections. When eco-
nomic or social rights are at stake, it remains the case that Community 
law exercises a considerable infl uence on the Member States, even with 
regard to nationality questions. The Member States have defi nitely lost a 
part of their sovereignty in these fi elds. 
The third reason is a direct consequence of the case law of the EC-
tHR. If the ECJ allows a Member State to exclude nationals from Euro-
pean elections when they reside outside the national territory, this con-
clusion, as a result of Matthews, is limited to territories where the EP 
plays no part as a legislative organ. In other cases, EU nationals must 
have the right to choose their deputies to the EP and stand as a candidate 
therefor. 
Last, and as already mentioned, the ECJ point of view is perfectly 
respectful of the constitutional reality framed by primary law. Rights to 
political participation are indeed very poorly defi ned in the EC Treaty 
and the 1976 Act, while economic freedoms are an essential part of the 
Community policy. As for the reference in Articles 189 and 190 EC to the 
‘peoples’ of Europe when they describe the Members of the EP, such a 
concept is quite theoretical and vague. Moreover, it is capable of differ-
ent meanings in the Member States. Consequently, in the commented 
judgments, the Court was not privileging one solution over another on 
grounds of the potential scope of the ‘European peoples’. For all these 
reasons, nothing could justify, in my opinion, the ECJ going further in 
harmonising the scope ratione personae of elections to the EP.
117  Ibidem.
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V. Conclusion
This leads us to some conclusive remarks. The current fundaments 
of EU citizenship are weak, especially in the fi eld of political rights. This 
is in particular the result of the lack of suffi ciently harmonised proce-
dural rules for elections to the European Parliament. The sheer number 
of members of the EP, the existence of national constituencies and, last 
but not least, the fact that European voters do not exercise a direct choice 
of members of the future European Commission prevent European Par-
liament elections from being any true citizens’ forum for EU politics.118 
As clearly illustrated by the continuously low voter turnout in European 
elections - even in 2004119 - the differences highlighted in this article 
between the various EU citizenship rights certainly do not improve the 
Union’s general public image.120 However, as evidenced by the judgments 
Spain v. United Kingdom and Eman & Sevinger, the ECJ certainly could 
not be held responsible for this situation. The problem is of a consti-
tutional nature. For this reason, the signifi cance of European elections 
in the European democratic process should be discussed globally once 
again at the political level.
118  See S Strudel, ‘La mise en oeuvre de la citoyenneté européenne dans les Etats membres. 
La citoyenneté européenne: “une réalité embarrassante”?’ in S Leclerc and J-F Akandji-
Kombé (eds), La citoyenneté européenne (Bruylant, Brussels 2007) 99. See also the interven-
tion of Prof. K Lenaerts at the Belgian Parliament on 17 March 2007 (Belgian Parliament, 
Compte-rendu intégral, Doc. Ch., sess. 2006-2007, 9 March 2007, COL 029, 58 <www.
lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/europe/COL029_PR.pdf> accessed 15 May 2007).
119  Communication from the European Commission of 12 December 2006, Commission 
report on the participation of European Union citizens in the Member State of residence (Di-
rective (EC) 93/109) and on the electoral arrangements (Decision 76/787/EC as amended 
by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom), COM(2006) 790 fi nal 5-8. See also M Franklin, ‘Eu-
ropean elections and the European voter’ in J Richardson (ed), European Union. Power and 
Policy Making (3rd edn Routeledge, Oxon 2006) 233-237.
120  They also demonstrate that the Union is no federal State since nationality remains the 
competence of the Member States. See R Kovar and D Simon (n 5) 294. See also A Von 
Bogdandy, ‘The Prospect of a European Republic: What European Citizens are Voting On’ 
(2005) 42 CML Rev 913-941.
